TO TEM DETERMIINATION OF CRIMES.

circumstances of aggravation or alleviation :" Comm. v. Gable, 7
S. & R. 435. These remarks refer more particularly to discretionary punishment exercised under a statute, but the discretion
of the judges is similarly exercised under the common law. The
principle is the same in both cases: Bex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr.
2539; 1 Lit. Abr. 477; Witman v. Bly, 4 S. & R. 265; 4 B1.
Com. 378-380.
37. The plan laid down, at the commencement of this treatise
has now been acted upon as fully as space would allow. The
origin, early history, and general principles of the common law
have been sought out, and an examination made into the application of these last, briefly to England, and much more fully to the
United States as a nation, and to the different states of the Union.
The different parts of the. subject have also been particularly considered.' In view of the whole question, and of the matter which
has been selected,, the following, from the London Jurist, p. 31,
for 1827, may not be an inapt conclusion:38. "The common law of the United States is becoming more
and more malleable; definition and certainty are supplanting
mystical traditions, and as the late accomplished American Judge
WILSON- remarked in a charge to a grand jury, 'the accommodating principle of a common law will adjust itself to every grade
and species of improvement, and attain, in the progress of time,
higher and higher* degrees of perfection, resulting from the
accumulated wisd6m of ages.'"

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
STUKELY THORNTON'S EXECUTORS v.-.STUKELY THORKTON'S

HEIRS.
The proponent of a contested will is required to produce and examine all the
attesting witnesses if in his power so to do.
The law of this state follows the rule of the English Court of Chancery, which,
before a will could be established, required all the subseribingwitnesscs to-be exam-

I See

supra, p. 1, § 19 and n.
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ined, unless impracticable, as in cases where an attesting witness is dead, insane,
absent from the state, or rendered incompetent subsequent to his attestation.
The rule is founded upon reasons of policy and caution, and has no reference to
the measure of proof. The will should be admitted to probate if there is a fair balance of testimony in favor of its validity.
While the will may not be established without the testimony of the subscribing
witnesses when obtainable, it may be without this testimony in its favor. It may
be probated against this testimony by proof of the necessary facts from others.
It is well settled that a party may prove the facts in issue to be different from a
statement of them made by witnesses he has called.
But, as a general rule, a party is estopped from introducing testimony merelyto
discredit his own witness, even though the witness has been examined by the other
party upon new matter. The sanity of the testator is not new matter as distinguished from the regularity of the signatures; but both are branches of the same
matter-the due execution of the will.
This general rule is not inflexible. If the subscribing witness to a will gives
testimony against his attestation to the effect that the decedent was not of testamentary capacity, the proponent, who has been compelled by the rule, of law to
call him, is at liberty not only to prove the fact to be otherwise, but also to impeach
the credit of such witneis by proving that the witness has made previous declarations inconsistent with his testimony.
The proponent of the contested will produced the three subscribing witnesses and
examined two, but declined to examine the third. The court required the proponent to examine the third which he did under this order, but only as to the formalities
of the execution. On cross-examination the witness said that the decedent was not
of sound mind when he executed the will. The proponent was then permitted to
impeach the witness by proving his previous declarations to the effect that the decedent was of testamentary capacity at the time in question ; and it is held there was
no error.
The testimony of a subscribing witness as to the sanity 9f the testator is required
in part on account of his special opportunity and occasion to observe the capacity
of the decedent at the precise moment in question, but is to be weighed not only
with reference to this but also with reference to his care, skill, judgment, memory,
and truth. His testimony is not invested by law with any fictitious official value
beyond what it is worth under the usual considerations which govern the value of
testimony..
It was not error for the court to refuse to tell the jury that, certain testimony
against the sanity of the decedent created a strong 1resumption against the validity of the will, even though it came from an attesting witness who was also the
attending physician of the alleged testator.
A draft of a will which was never executed by the testator but was made under
his direction, may, where accompanied by proper evidence, afford "vvery considerable light' upon the question of the testator's intentions, and is evidence upon
the questions of capacity and undue influence.
The party discharged but did not conceal a witness who was subsequently called
and examined by the other party. It was not error for the court to not permit the
party to be asked whether he discharged the witness on account of an apprehension
that he would testify to certain facts.
When a witness, after being once examined and dismissed, returns to correct an
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error in his testimony, the court may in their discretion limit the cros.-examination
strictly to the point corrected.
That a legacy is made which would not have been thought of but for the suggestion of another, does not necessarily prove incapacity. That suggestions were
made does not necessarily prove that the legacy would have been forgotten without
them, but it is a circumstance proper to be considered with others upon the main
question of capacity. The contestant is not, on special request, entitled to a charge
that the jury may infer that the legacies suggested would have been forgotten but
for the suggestion, and that from this they may infer incapacity. It is enough if
the court gives the jury the true rule as to what constitutes testamentary capacity,
and directs the attention of the jury to the classes of evidence on each side which
relate to it.
here the testimony is conflicting, a party cannot, on special request, insist that
the court shall collate certain conceded and certain disputed facts-relating to the
testator's age, infirmity, malady, the fairness 6f the will, the importunities of
legatees and the persons about him-and isolating these facts from others which
affect their force, make them the subject of a distinct branch of his charge to
the jury, as sufficient, if found, to authorize the jury to infer undue influence. It
is enough if the court gives the jury the true rule as to what constitutes such undue
influence as to invalidate a will, and, after calling their attention to the matters
named in the request and to the other evidence on each side bearing upon this point,
leaves the jury to pass upon the question in view of all these facts together.

TrIS was an appeal to the County Court from the decree of
the Probate Court, allowing the instrument in question as the last
will and testament of Stukely Thornton. The case was tried by
jury in the County Court of Rutland county, Mfarch Term 1865,
KIELLOGG, J., presiding. The case passed to the Supreme Court
on exceptions, and was first heard at the January Term 1866, in
Rutland, and subsequently, by order of court, re-argued at the
General Term held at Montpelier in October 1866.
Daniel -loberts and aeorge W. fHarmon, for the proponents.
-E. J. P elps, Edwin -Edgerton, and C. C. Dewey, for the
contestants.
The opinion of the court, which sufficiently states the facts
upon the main questions involved, was delivered by
S-TEELE, J.
I. 1. In the County Court, upon appeal from the
Probate Court, on trial of the issue whether the probate should
pass, the proponent of the will examined two of the attesting witnesses and produced the third, Dr. Woodward, but declined to
examine him. The court ruled that the third must also be examined by the proponent. The third was accordingly under this
order of the court examined, but only in respect to the formal
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execution of the will. Then, on cross-examination, the witness
stated in substance, that the decedent was not, in his judgment,
of testamentary capacity when he executed the will in question.
After the usual preliminary inquiries, the proponent was permitted
in the progress of the trial, for the avowed purpose of impeaching the credit of the witness Woodward, to prove, by the deposition of Mr. Parker and by other persons, that the witness had out
of court expressed a different opinion, to the effect that the decedent was of sound mind at the time, and that his faculties seemed
to have been just spared to make this will. To the admission of
this impeaching testimony the contestants excepted, upon the
ground that the proponent should not be allowed to attack the
credit of his own witness.
The first question for decision is, whether it is necessary for the
proponent, in order to establish a will, to produce and examine all
the attesting witnesses, when in his power so to do. If this is not
necessary, Dr. Woodward might be treated as not the witness of
the proponent. The case would resemble Rex v. O1d2oyd, Russ.
& Ry. Cr. Cases 88, in which the judge of his own motion called
as a witness the prisoner's mother, whose name was indorsed on
the indictment as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, but
who had not been called by the prosecuting counsel. Her testimony proved favorable to the prisoner; and the court then permitted her to be impeached, by reference to her former deposition.
In this, although the trial was upon an indictment for murder, all

the judges, including Lord MANSFI

and Lord ELLENBOROUGH,

held there was no error.
Our statute requires wills to be attested by three witnesses, but
is silent as to the manner in which they shall be proved when
contested. When not contested the statute provides, that they
may in the discretion of the judge be admitted to probate upon
the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses: Gen. Stat.
p. 379, § 18. This provision would indicate that more were to
be required in other cases. In an English common law court,
when, as in an action of ejectment, the issue was made upon the
validity of a will, the devisee was obliged to call but one of the
attesting witnesses, if that one testifies to a sufficient execution:
1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's Ed.) 496, 501; Anstay v. -Dowsing, 2 Str. 1254; Jackson ex dem. Le Grange v. -Le Grange,
19 Johns. 386. In the Ecclesiastical Courts, it was necessary
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that all should be produced by the devisee, if in his power ; but
he was not required to examine all himself: The Lochlibe, 1 Eng.
Law & Eq. 645-7.
It is urged that one or the other of these rules should prevail'
here. But, it is to be remembered, that at common law a will is
proved merely for the purpose of the case on trial, and may be
again put in issue; and in the Ecclesiastical Courts it was proved
with reference to the distribution of none but personal estate: 2
Bouvier's Bac. Ab. 730. The only method by which until
recently a will, when it related to real as well as personal estate,
dould be established in England, was by a bill in Chancery; and
in such cases, says Lord CAmDEN (Hindson v. Kersey, 4 Burn.
Eco. law 91), it was the C1 invariable practice" to require the
three witnesses to be examined. It would seem, however, that
upon an issue in Chancery, other than for the purpose of establishing the will, the examination of the three witnessei was not
required. So, in the case Tatham v. Wright, 2 Russ. & Mylne 1,
reported also in 6 Eng. Ch. Rep. 366, where the will.was attacked
by the heir-at-law, who brought his bill praying that the will be
declared void, and the devisee be restrained from setting up a
legal estate as a bar to an ejectment, and issues upon the validity
of the will were made up and sent out for trial by jury before
PARxE, J., one only of the subscribing witnesses was examined
by the devisee, the others being produced in court and offered to
the other party. The verdict being in favor of the will, the heirat-law filed a motion for a new trial, which was refused by Sir
JOHN LEACH,

Master of the Rolls.

The heir then moved the

Lord Chancellor for a new trial, and in the mean time his counsel
Mr. Brougham, who had acted for him before the jury and had
argued in behalf of the motion before the Master of the Rolls,
had himself become Lord Chancellor. Under these circumstances

Lord BROUGHAM asked Lord Chief Justice TINDAL and Lord
LYNDHURST to sit with him, and all three agreed that the motion
was not well founded and must be refused. Lord BROUGHAM
remarking, "1there is a broad line of distinction between cases
where the moving party seeks to set the will aside, and cases
where the moving party is a devisee seeking to establish it ; the
rule which makes it imperative to call all the witnesses to a will,
must be considered as applicable to the latter only." The application of this rule to" establishing wills" is also recognised in the

346

THORNTON'S EXECUTORS v. THORNTON'S HEIRS.

opinion of the Lord Chief Justice in behalf of himself and the Lord
Chief Baron. The same doctrine was distinctly held by Lord
ELDON: Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Yes. Jr. 501-508. See also Chase
v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. 236 ; 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's Ed.) 496-7;
Ogle v. Cook, iVes. Sen. 177; 10 Bouvier's Bac. Abr. 518-19, and
cases cited. There are some dicta to the effect that this rule was
not invariable, but we are aware of no English Case in Chancery5 in
which a will was established without the production and examination of all the subscribing witnesses, if all were within reach of
process and obtainable-unless it may be in case of waiver by
the heir-at-law.
It is held that the production of attesting witnesses is excused
by proof of their death (Nicokerson v. Buck, 12 Cush. 332),
-insanity (Bennett v. Taylor, 9 Yes. Jr. 381), absence from the
country (Lord Carringtonv. Payne, 5 Yes. Jr. 404)5 or incompetency a~rising subsequent to their attestation (2 Redf. Wills 34,
Gen. Stat., p. 378-9, §§ 10, 19. See also Wyndham v. Chetwynd, 1 Blaqk. Rep. 95). The rule which requires them all to
be examined, if practicable, is founded upon reasons of policy
and caution, and has no reference to the measure of proof necessary to establish a will, which is a measure no greater than is
usually required to establish a fact: Dean v. Dean, 27 Verm.
750. The proponent of a contested will is entitled to prevail, if
there is a fair balance of testimony in favor of the validity of the
will. We think, if our statute requires any aid for i s interpretation from the English practice, in determining how many subscribing witnesses should be called to prove a will, we should look
to that English court in which alone wills were, as in our Probate
.Court, established; and to the rule of that court in establishing
wills, instead of regarding the -rule at law or in the Ecclesiastical
Courts, or even in the recent English Court of Probate. So far
as we are informed, the production and: examination of all the
witnesses have been always required and thought.necessary in
this state. See opinion of IsHAM, J., in Dean v. Dean, 27
Verm. 749,. We are of opinion that the court was correct in
ruling that the proponent must examine all the attesting witnesses.
2. This being settled, the next question is-Was the testimony
on behalf of the proponent to impeach one of these witnesses, by
his previous declarations, admissible ? It is useless to attempt
to justify the admission of this testimony under any-general rule.
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The due execution of a will involves the question of sanity as
well as of signature, but even if this was not so, and the crossexamination instead of being legitimate had been so much upon
a new subject as to deprive the contestant of the right, except by.
leave of court, to ask leading questions, still, under the general
rule, the witness remains the witness of the party who produced
him, so far that he may not be impeached by that party: Fenton
v. Hughes, 7 Yes. 287 ; B7llicott v. Pearl, 12 Curtis 187-8
(from 10 Pet. 440-1). Nor can the testimony relating to the
previous declarations of the witness be regarded as proof of a
substantive fact (Gould v. Norfolk Lead Co., 9 Cush. 338), so
as to come within the rule which permits a witness to be contradicted, and thus incidentally impeached by proving ihe facts in
issue to be different from his statement of them: Friedlanderv.
London Insurance Co., 24 E. 0. L. 47, 4 B. & Ad. 193; -Ewer
v. Ambrose, 10 E. 0. L. 220 and note, 3 B. & 0. 746; Sigfried
v. Levan, 6 S. & R. 308; The Lochlibe, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep.
645-8-9-651, a rule which is so well recognised that while a
will may not be established without the evidence of the attesting
witnesses, it may be established against the combined testimony
of them all by proof from others: Lowe v. Jolliffe, 1 Black's
Rep. 365; Adams v. Field, 21 Verm. 256,; Jauncey v. Thorne,
2 Barb. Oh. 40 ; Bowman v. Christman, 4 Wend. 277 ; 10 Bou'vier's Bac. Abr. 527, and cases cited.
The declaratios of Dr. Woodward out of court cannot be
shown to prove his opinion. Such statements could only have
weight in impeaching the credit of Woodward, and not in establishing what his opinion was or how the fact was. That the proponent examined the witness only so far as the law made it his
imperative duty to examine him; that he then sought to impeach
him, not by attacking his general reputation, but only in respect
to this testimony by his own declarations inconsistent therewith;
that these declarations were made after he was selected as an
attesting witness by the decedent; that whatever the usual presumption of law is, his credibility was, in fact, not indorsed by
the party who called him under compulsion, are rather reasons to
be urged why this testimony should be received against the
general rule, than arguments to prove that such testimony is
receivable under it. On the other hand, there is no force in the
objection to the admission of this testimony so far as it is put
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upon'the ground, that it is an impeachment of the legal proof,
without which the will may not be established; for the will may,
as has already been remarked, be established against it by other
proof. Thd rule which provides that the will shall not be probated
without this testimony, does not provide that it shall not be probated without this testimony in its favor. Being participants in
the execution, if the will was duly signed, and thus having- special
opportunity and occasion to observe and know what the trier must
ascertain to determine upon the validity of the will, the law as
well as sound policy requires them to be called and heard. It
does not require them to believed. Their claim to belief depends
not only upon their opportunities of knowledge upon the subject,
but also upon their care, skill, judgment, memory, and truth.
While it is settled that their testimony may be overcome or outweighed by testimony from others, produced on behalf of the same
party, the question now is whether the force of their testimony
to be thus overcome, may be lessened by an impeachment of their
credit, as was done in this case, or whether, on the contrary, the
proof from others must be sufficient to establish the fact and outweigh or overcome theirs, not lessened in force by any such
impeachment.
We are not aware that the rule, that a party is estopped from
impeaching the credit of his own witness, has ever been recognised as inflexible. It is not so treated by the text writers. Mr.
Phillips says, it will not in general be allowed, but in remarking
upon impeachment by previous declarations, refers to the opinion
expressed by Lord MANSFIELD and Lord ELLENBOROUGH in OlZIroyd's Case, before referred to, tW the effect that the prosecutor
.would have had the same right with the court, to impeach the
credit of the witness by her former depqsition under the circumstances of that case. Mr. Starkie also refers to the question as
unsettled, and thinks that upon reason and principle it should, in
some cases, be allowed to the extent of proving the representations of the witness upon the subject in relation to which he testified. Mr. Greenleaf refers to the question as one upon which
there is a diversity of opinion, but says that the weight of authority seems to be in favor of allowing witnesses to be impeached
by former declarations, in some cases. In the course of his discussion of the subject, he refers particularly to cases in which the
witness is one "whom the law obliges the party to call, such as
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the subscribing witness, to a deed or will or the like ;" and seems
to think their general credit may be impeached by the party calling them: 1 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's Ed.) 309-1i; 1 Starkie's
Ev. 217-20; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 443. See also discussion of cases,
relating to right of party to contradict, and sometimes even to
discredit his witness in 2 Ph. & Amos Ev. (5th Am. Ed.) 838-43
[*902 et seq.].
Nor are the books destitute of express judicial decisions to the
same effect. The refusal to admit precisely such testimony as
this on the part of the proponent, to impeach the subscribing witAiess of a will, was disapproved by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Cowden v- Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 280, and a new
trial granted that it might be received. So, too, in -Dennett v.
Dow, 17 Maine 19, a new trial was granted upon the sole ground
that the court below rejected such testimony in a trial upon the
issues of the sanity of the testator, and the due execution of the
will. This case was affirmed by iSorey v. Hussey, 32 Iaine 579.
In South Carolina, the admission of evidence to impeach the
general credit of the subscribing witness to a deed, on the part
of the party who called him, was approved: Williams v. Walker,
2 Rich. Eq. Rep. 291.
In Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Vesey, Jr., 500, 502-509, all the
attesting witnesses gave their depositions in the Court of Chan"cery, but upon trial of the issues sent by the court to the jury
one only of the subscribing witnesses was examined, the plaintiff
declining to examine the other two. The plaintiff introduced
other proof, strongly in his favor, and the defendant then gave
up the cause. Afterwards the defendant moved for a new trial
because all the attesting witnesses were not examined. The Lord
Chancellor (ELuoN) holding that the heir at law might waive the
rule of court for his benefit that all the attesting witnesses must
be examined, and from an examinatioi of the whole record, being
satisfied that their testimony would not alter the result, and
guarding the case as a precedent, denied the motion: but expressed great dissatisfaction with the irregularity of the trial, and
remarked that the subscribing witnesses "are the witnesses of
this court and not of either party, as erroneously considered."
"If," he says, "the object is to establish a will, this court does
not give the devisee the opportunity of carrying it before a jury
until all the three witnesses have been examined, and will have
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them all examined, considering them as its witnesses, without
entering into the dispute frequently occurring in a court of law,
whether the person called is the witness of the one party or the
other." "This court, therefore, before an heir shall be deprived
of that opportunity which the law gives him by repeated ejectments to question again and again the validity of the will, until
his conduct constitutes a case of that vexatious nature which
induces the court to grant an injunction, the court, as it will
know the whole truth, expects that all the witnesses shall be examined on the one side or the other. If I had tried such an issue
I should have told the jury that these witnesses, if not to be considered the witnesses of the plaintiff, were not, though they had
been called by the defendant, his witnesses, but that this was a
proceeding to try the actual fact with a view to the information
of this court; who must, to establish the will, know the whole,
and therefore the case must go to trial without that prejudice
which is the consequence of considering them as the witnesses of
either party, and merely as a judicial proceeding to inform the
court."
In all these cases the witnesses were what may be called
instrumental witnesses. Many cases may be cited the other
way (as see Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 194; Queen v. State, 5
Harr. & John. 232; Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 801 ; W-hitaker v. Salisbury, 15 Pick. 5.44) ; and in such a, conflict of authority, this being the first occasion on which the question has, so
far as we are informed, arisen here, we have felt considerable
hesitation about admitting an exception to a wholesome general
rule. But where the reason of a rule ceases the rule generally
should also, unless some special inconvenience or mischief will be
likely to arise from the practical application of -the exception.
The reason of the general rule is that a party should be estopped
from impeaching the credit of the witness whose credibility he
indorses by calling him. The reason fails when in fact the party
is, as in this case, compelled by law to call him, no matter how
much he doubts the credibility of the witness, before he can be
allowed to prove his case by others on whom he relies. There
certainly would seem to be no ground in reason or convenience in
holding the party estopped from impeaching such a witness to the
extent of proving his former declarations on the same subject.
The fairness of holding a party estopped by reason of an act with
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relation to which be has no choice or by an indorsement which
he does not make of a witness whom the law calls and makes
current whether the party indorses him or not, may well be
questioned. It would seem enough that the party is obliged to'
examine him and make his way through him by such an impeachment and to prove the facts by others-that he is required to
furnish the court with the testimony of the attesting witnesses on
account of the presumption of their knowledge of the matter, with
the permission to endeavor to overcome their testimony if adverse--without tying his hands in the effort to overcome it, by
depriving him of the ordinary, natural, and most effective means
to aid him in so doing. The case is quite different from the one
supposed, in which the only person who knows a material fact, as
in an assault, is called from the necessity of the edse and testifies
against the party who called him. If no one else knows the fact
the party cannot be benefited by impeaching the witness, because
that will not prove the fact; and if any one else does know it and
is reliable, he should have seen to it that he called the reliable
witness. He is at liberty to choose. But if by some rule of law
he was first compelled to call one of the witnesses in preference
to the other, the cases would be similar. It is strongly urged that
though the witness may not have.been indorsed by the proponent,
he was indorsed by the decedent. If we assume that he signed
-at the request of the decedent, which in some cases might be the
point in question,' and that the devisee who claims tbrough the
will to represent the decedent is more responsible for the decedent's selection than the contestant who claims by heirship to
represent him, still the case stands very differently from the case
of any other than an instrumentalwitness. That individual of
the bystanders who was asked to write his name as a witness must
be called. In ordinary cases of requesting a bystander to remember and bear witness, the party would not be required to call
the person whose attention was invited, if he preferred to call
others instead. The witnesses to an instrument, even if carefully
selected at the time they attest, may change in character, feeling,
and interest before being called to testify. To forbid the proponent the impeachment of a witness to the will by his own declarations made after his selection as an attesting witness, while, if he
becomes entirely] incompetent, the will may be proved without
his testimony, would, we fear, be carrying the general rule to an
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extent which would be inconsistent and could only be justified by
artificial and arbitrary reasons, and which would not be calculated
to aid the truth, the ultimate end of laws of evidence. We are
aware that many but not all the reasons for admitting this testimony would apply as well to an impeachment of a general nature.
But the authorities have in many instances made a clear distinction between the admission of an impeachment of the general
veracity of the witness and an impeachment by proving declarations of the witness inconsistent with his testimony. Whether
the distinction is well taken we desire to express no opinion.
We think this testimony, to the extent and under the circumstances of its admission in this case, was properly received.
3. Another question grows out of the testimony of this attesting
witness, Dr. Woodward. The contestants excepted'to the refusal
of the court to instruct the jury in accordance with their sixth
request " that the testimony of Dr. Jonathan D. Woodward, as
being one of the subscribing witnesses to the instrument in question and the attending physician of the alleged testator, was
entitled to much consideration on the question of capacity, and
raised a strong presumption against the validity of the will."
The weight of his testimony, so far as it depended on his being a
medical attendant of the decedent, must be conceded to have been
a matter of fact with relation to which the comments of the court
are not a subject of exception. But it is claimed that the weight
of his testimony; so far as it depended on his being a subscribing
witness, was a matter of law and that the court was bound to rule
as requested, even though the witness was contradicted by both
the other subscribing witnesses and by his own previous.declarations, and even though by his own statement he made no suggestion to any one, at the time of the execution of the will, that he
doubted the testator's capacity, and was not sure that he had any
conversation with the testator on the day in question. The court
in response to this request told the jury that they should consider
his professional skill and experience, but that the weight and
value of his testimony must also be determined, like that of the
other witnesses on this subject, "with reference to his opportunity for observation, his skill and care in observing, his intelligence and powers of discernment and memory," which doubtless
would ordinarily be a correct rule for measuring the value of the
testimony of a truthful witness. Is there a weight given by law
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to the testimony of a subscribing witness apart from or beyond
what it would be entitled to under these considerations which
usually govern the value of testimony ? We think the prominence which, in opinions where both law and fact are discussed,
is given by courts to the testimony of a subscribing witness to a,
will, arises from his acknowledged opportunity of observation at
the precise time in question, and from the probability of his using
the opportunity on account of his participation in the transaction.
If it clearly appears from his own testimony that he did not use
the opportunity, this special value of his opinion ceases. It is
because of this opportunity, and not because he wrote his name
on the instrument, that the testimony of an attesting witness is
usually listened to with attention, and it was with reference to
this opportunity that the jury were instructed to weigh the testimony of Dr. Woodward. It was not entitled to more weight than
testimony from other witnesses of equal credit, better opportunity,
and more judgment and knowledge upon the subject. It should
not be invested by law with any fictitious official weight, so as to
pass for more than it is worth ; and its real value, if truthful, is
measurable by the rules laid down by the court. This question
is to some extent involved in the one already passed upon. If
evidence to impeach the credit of Dr. Woodward was properly
received, it would hardly be consistent to hold as a matter of law
that his testimony deserved especial consideration and carried a
.strong presumption with it, whether his credit was successfully
impeached or not.1 We find no error in the refusal of the request
or in the instructions of the court upon the subject.
II. The contestants in their eleventh request asked the court
to rule that for the reasons named in their request, "the evidence
in regard to the two previous wills drawn up but not executed by
the alleged testator, afforded no proof of any intention on his part
that could be taken into consideration on the question of capacity
or influence." It is well settled that'evidence of previous wills,
executid or unexecuted, drawn under the instructions of the
testator, is admissible. So, too, evidence is received, as was
01ae here, to prove the condition of the testator's estate, lia

~.I..iy

relations, affections, and declarations

of testamentary

A to value of testimony of attesting witness, see note (1), Burrowes v. Ic,*.
Ve-ey (Stninur's edition), p. 476.
%'11L. XV.-23
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intention, accompanied by no act. Such evidence informs the
triers of the preferences of the testator,, and the operations of his
mind upon the subject, when he was confessedly in sound health,
and thus aids them in determining whether the instrument in
question was the work of the same will. The counsel for the
contestants concede in argument the admssiiliy of this testi-

mony, but deny that it is entitled to any force. To be admissible,
it must be relevant to one of the two questions tried, capacityand influence; and if the court had told the jury, as requested,
that it was not to be considered on either of these questions, he
would have ruled the evidence out of the case. The reasons of the
request are, in substance, that the other testimony in the case
destroyed the force of this. The jury would be the judges upon
that question if the other testimony was conflicting, or if it was
of a character not to necessarily deprive this testimony of all
weight. The first ground upon Which this request is based is,
that the testimony of Colvin shows the two unexecuted wills to be
unlike. If they were substantially unlike, it might lessen but not
destroy their title .to consideration. The testimony of Colvin
does, however, tend to show that they were substantially alike.
The draft of 1858, as he says, was left unexecuted by the decedent on account of a difficulty between the testator and the heirs
of his deceased son Jeremiah, which it appears involved not over
six hundred dollars, and the draft of 1860 was made in order, as
the testator said, to make this right. The witness remembers no
other material changes. The heirs of Jeremiah were still made
legatees in the draft of 1860, and Were provided for -more generously than other grandchildren of the testator. The second
ground of this request is, that the draft of .1860 was made with
relation to this difficulty, which the contestant's evidence tended
to show ceased before the will in questioni was executed in 1865.
The testimony on the subject of the continuance of the difficulty
was conflicting, and the court could not in any event have based
upon it the charge requested, without deciding the fact. But
assuming that the jury found that the difficulty was healed, the
case is not changed; for the will of 1865 did make a different
bequest to these heirs from the one provided in the draft of 1860,
while most of the legacies remained substantially the same. They
were precisely the same to the heirs of his other deceased son
Stukely. No change was made in the legatees, with the excep-
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tion of the addition of Mary E. Maranville, who was not born
when the draft was made, and is made to divide the bequest which
was there provided for her sister, and the substitution of the
widow of Abel Thornton, as residuary legatee, in the place of
Abel Thornton himself, he having died since 1860, and before the'
execution of the will in question. The other reason, which is
made the ground of this request, is the fact that the testator kept
the draft of 1860 until 1865 without executing it. This was a
proper subject of comment on both sides, but that an intention is
not executed is not conclusive proof that no intention existed.
Upon the undisputed facts of the case we think the court was
justifiqd in telling the jury that the instructions to Colvin, with
relation to drawing the unexecuted will of 1860, should in any
event be regarded as affording 1 very considerable light" upon
the question of the testator's intentions. So far as the will in
question varied from the draft, or so far as that part of the
instructions which related to the heirs of Jeremiah affected the
case, the contestants had the advantage of it under this charge.
We therefore think there was no error in this portion, of the
charge, either considered with reference to the refusal of the
request, or considered affirmatively with reference to the instructions the court did give the jury.
III. 1. The court refused to permit the party to be inquired
of whether it was not his apprehension that Wood would testify
in a particular wanner which induced him to discharge Wood
from further attendance, on his behalf, as a witness.. It is not
claimed that the witness was concealed. He was merely discharged, and afterwards summoned and examined by the other
party. We think no error can be based upon this ruling.
2. Nor do we think that the refusal of the court to permit Willard,
after he returned and corrected a point in his testimony, to be
re-cross-examined except strictly upon the point corrected, can be
treated as a ruling upon a question of law. In the opinion of the
majority of the court, it was entirely in the discretion of the judge
whether the cross-examination should be thus limited or not; and
in the opinion of other members of the court the question was
improper, because it called the attention of the witness to no
single point in his testimony in the Probate Court, but to the
whole collectively, and assumed that there was a contradiction
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between the testimony of the witness then and in the County
Court.
3. The question allowed to be put on cross-examination to Dr.
Allen is objectionable, because it assumes a state of facts upon
which no medical or expert opinion could be based. Dr. Allen
seems to have so understood it, and declined to give any su-h
professional opinion, but replied in substance: "I must understand from your question that the man was able to make a will."
The whole matter stands as if the question was unanswered, and
the propriety of the question, as the correlative of the one asked
on the examination in chief, need not be considered.
IV. 1. The contestants except to the refusal of the court to tell
the jury, in accordance with the third and fourth requests, that
if his wife and the great-grandchildren; Stukely, Maynard, and
Flora J. and Mary E. Maranville, who are all legatees, would
have been omitted in the will by the testator, without motive, but
for the promptings and suggestions of others, they would be
authorized to infer testamentary incapacity. The main evidence
upon which this request is founded is the testimony to the effect
that some one said to the testator, when he was giving his instructions for the drawing of his will, "you must not forget Stukely
and the little ones," and he said he had not, and remembered
them with the same amount of property he had set apart for them
in the unexecuted draft; and the testimony of another witness
that his wife who was present said to him that he must not forget
Stukely, and he replied, "I must not forget my wife." It is not
clear that any one used this language with reference to any supposed lack of memory. It seems rather to have been used as a
reminder, on the part of the heirs who were present, of their
,desire that these little ones should be remembered with a bequest.
We think the evidence that they would, have been forgotten is
exceedingly slight and inferential. There is other evidence of
conversation between the testator and the scrivener, and with the
wife as to her legacy, but it adds very little, if anything, to that
mentioned. That a legacy is made which would not have been
thought of but for the suggestion of another does not necessarily
prove incapacity. It might occur with the strongest mind in the
vigor of youth and health. The fact that such suggestions were
made is proper evidence to consider with other circumstances
upon the question of capacity. The court did tell the jury, in
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response to the second request, that the testator must have been
capable, without prompting, of collecting and retaining in his
mind long enough to form a rational judgment upon them, the
amount and condition of his estate, the names and number of those.
having claims upon him, their relative merits and necessities, and
what he had before done for each; in short, that "1he must have
been capable of recollecting the full state of all his affairs, and
of weighing the just merits and demerits of those who belonged to
him, by remembering all and forgetting none;" subsequently
properly explaining and qualifying this expression so as not to fix
a standard of capacity equal to the transactions of an extensive
or complicated business. We do not think that the contestants
were entitled, in addition to this, to an application of this rule to
a supposed omission of particular individuals which the jury
might find, would have been made but for the prompting of others.
To say to the jury that, from this scrap of evidence, they might
infer that some one would have been forgotten, and that from this
inference they might infer testamentary incapacity, and to make
this the subject of a distinct separate submission to the jury, would
have been giving this evidence a very undue prominence. It
would have been more becoming in the argument than in the
charge of the court to the jury. We think that it was enough
that this evidence was given the jury, with other surrounding
-circumstances, to be weighed on the main question.
2. For s6mewhbt similar reasons, we think the court was right
in refusing the ninth request, in which the contestants had collated certain conceded and certain disputed facts, and isolating
them from others which would affect their force, asked the court
to say to the jury, that they might infer undue influence from
them if found. The court properly explained to the jury what
would amount to undue influence, and called the attention of the
jury to the different classes of testimbny tending to show it, and
left it for them to say how the fact was. It was not the duty of
the court to isolate a part of the case from the other facts which
affected it, and make this unreal case the subject of one separate
branch of his charge. All the matters named in the ninth request,
namely, the age of the testator, his infirmity, the nature of his
malady, the fairness of the will, the effects of undue importunity,
the circumstances under which the will was made, were called to
thd attention of the jury, and they were left to decide the question
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of undue influence in view of all the facts together. The court
was not bound to tell the jury just how much evidence would be
sufficient to sustain a verdict upon the ground of undue influence.
Had no other facts appeared in the case qualifying those named
in the ninth request, it might have been error for the court to
refuse to charge as therein requested. The other exceptions
saved on the trial were abandoned in this court.
The result is, the judgment of the County Court is affirmed, and
ordered to be certified to the Probate Court.
We feel gratified to be able to speak
in unqualified commendation of the
manner in which the foregoing opinion
is prepared, with the single exception
of its extreme length,, which is not the
most objectionable feature in legal opinions. The points decided here are so
numerous that the whole opinion must
necessarily cover considerable space.
-And it is really refreshing to read an
opinion like this, where the judge and
the counsel have nobly surveyed and
mastered the whole ground, and read
through every case bearing upon the
questions decided.
The points determined are not free
from doubt and difficulty, and one has,
perhaps, no right to make serious objection to any view which one may choose
to take in regard to them. But it is
well, we think, .to make as few exceptional rules in the law of evidence as
practicable. It has always seemed to
Uzsthat the better rule in regard to the
proof of wills, is that which obtains in
the common law courts and the Court
of Probate, and formerly in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, that the
party setting up the will must produce
all the subscribing witnesses which are
within his power, and may examine one
or more, at his election, and give the
other party the opportunity of examining the others.. In the common law
courts, upon an issue affecting the title of
real estate depending upon a will, it was
not held indispensable for the party

claiming under the will to produce any
more than one of the witnesses, if he
was willing to incur the unfavorable
presumption likely to arise from his not
producing the others in court. And in
chancery, in all cases except upon a bill
in favor of the devisee against the heirs,
to establish the will, the same rule prevails as in the Ecclesiastical and Probate
Courts in England. This great preponderance of authority, and the greater
symmetry thereby preserved in the law,
would have induced us to have adopted
that view, probably. For in that mode
of procedure there would have been no
inconsistency in allowing the party setting up the will to contradict the witnesses
not called by him, if they gave testimony
against the will, by showing that they
had made declarations out of court inconsistent with their evidence in court: or
even to allow such party to impeach such
of the subscribing witnesses as are not
called by him.
As to those of the subscribing witnesses to' a will whom we require the
party to call, there is no very great harm
done in making an exception in favor
of the party thus compelled to call the
witness to the extent of allowing him to
discredit the witness thus compulsorily
called by him, by general evidence of
want of veracity, or by proof of contradictory statements made out of court.
But, to be consistent, if we allow the
party, under such circumstances, to impeach his own witness in one mode, we
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certainly should not refuse the same
thing in another form.
We should, therefore, have preferred
to let a subscribing witness to a will who
volunteers to discredit himself by impeaching his own solemn attestation,
stand upon such impeachment alone,
inasmuch as we regard it by far the most
effectual impeachment. which could be
offered, inasmuch as it is altogether
deliberate and without apology or excuse.
The Vermont practice in the Probate
Court for a great number of years, and
especially the recent statute there, allow-

ing the Probate Court, in their discretion,
to grant probate of wills upon the testimony of one witness, when no one appears to contest it, give great countenance
to the rule established in this case.
I
There can be no doubt that instrutions
given by the testator for drawing a will,
or the draft, 'if known to him or made
in conformity with his instructions,
although not executed by him, is of great
importance upon any question of testamentary capacity or undue influence.
The other points decided seem most
I. F. R.
unquestionable.

District Court of Phitaddphia.
CREIGHTON v. LADLEY.
Where a copy of a lease was duly certified to have been acknowledged before a
magistrate, and recorded with the mortgage under the Act of 27th April 1855,
respecting chattel mortgages, it was held, that, in the absence of evidence of fraud,
and where the question was not upon the execution and delivery of the lease, the
certificate could not be contradicted by parol evidence.

RuLE for new trial.

Mcall,for plaintiff.
Blackburn, for defendant.
Opinion by
SHARswooD, P. J.-This was an action of replevin for machinery and fixtures in a woollen-mill. The title of the plaintiff was
as a purchaser at sheriff's sale under a Tpuries levarifaciasupon
a mortgage of lease and machinery from William Tomlinson, lessee
from Sarah Hurst to Hugh Creighton"and Joshua Pearce.
The plaintiff's title depends upon the Act of 27th April 1855,
§ 8, Pamph. Laws 369, by which it is "declared to be lawful for
every lessee, for term of years, of any colliery, mining land,
manufactory, or other premises, to mortgage his or her lease or
term in the demised premises, with all buildings, fixtures, and
machinery thereon, to the lessee belonging or thereunto appurtenant, with the same effect as to the lessee's interest and title, as
in the case of the mortgaging of a freehold interest and title as to
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lien, notice, evidence, and priority of payment: Provided, that
the mortgage be in like manner acknowledged and placed of record in the proper county, together with the lease; and that such
mortgage shall in nowise interfere with the landlord's right, priority, or remedy for rent; and such mortgages may be sued out
as in other cases."
The defendants objected in the case before us to the validity of
the plaintiff's title because the lease was not recorded with the
mortgage. The fact was, that the instrument left with the recorder of deeds and recorded by him was not the original lease,
but a copy of it. Such copy, however, although appearing to be
a copy on its face, had annexed to it a regular acknowledgment
before an alderman, in which it was duly certified that Mrs.
Hurst had personally appeared before the alderman and had
acknowledged that paper to be her act and deed, and desired the
same to be recorded as such.
Parol evidence was admitted on the trial, to contradict this
certificate, and the jury have found against it. The judge before
whom the case was tried is satisfied, that upon the weight of the
evidence the verdict was right- We do not, therefore, enter upon
that question. The only point that remains is, whether, in the
absence of fraud or collusion in the grantee or mortgagee, effect
ought to be given to such parol evidence ? There could be no
pretence of any fraud in this case. It was not denied that there
was such a lease; that Mrs. Hurst had executed it; that it was a
valid subsisting lease ; and that the copy to which the certificate
was appended was a true copy. Mrs. Hurst, the lessor, who was
examined as a witness, denied that she had acknowledged that
paper to be her act and deed before the alderman. She admitted
that she acknowledged before him that she had executed a lease;
that was what she went before him to do.'
Mrs. Hurst was sui juris. The acknowledgment and recording
the lease did not place her in any worse condition than she was
already in. It was necessary to enable the lessee to'give a valid
and effectual mortgage under the act, but that in no way affected
her interest. It was her duty to acknowledge it; she probably
could have been compelled, by a decree in equity, to do so, especially if the ease was so circumstanced that it could not be placed
on record in any other way.
As the majority of the court think, that in the absence of fraud
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or collusion in the mortgagee or grantee, parol evidence ought
not to have been allowed to contradict the certificate of acknowledgment, it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether a true
copy of a lease referred to in a mortgage and annexed to it, and,
in fact recorded with it, though not entitled to be recorded as an
independent paper, is or is not a compliance with the provisions
of the Act of Assembly.
It is not pretended, that if Mrs. Hurst did, in the terms of the
certificate, personally appear and acknowledge that paper to be
her act and deed, it would not make it so, even though in point of
fact it was written, signed, and sealed by another person, if there
was no fraud on her intended or practised. If so, the case of
etamison v. Jamison, 3 Whart. 457, is in point. It was there
solemnly decided that the certificate of the judge or justice as to
the acknowledgment of a deed by a married woman, is to be
judged of solely by what appears on the face of the certificate
itself; and parol evidence is not admissible for the purpose
of contradicting the certificate, except in cases of fraud and
collusion.
Judge SERGEANT says, in delivering the opinion of the court:
"The judge or justice of the peace in taking an acknowledgment,
acts judicially, not ministerially. The law imposes on him the
duty of ascertaining by his own view and examination, the truth
.of the matters to which he is to certify, and points out precisely
his duty. Having thus intrusted him to see that the proper
forms are observed, his solemn certificate that they have been
observed, on the faith of which parties act, contracts are proceeded in, moneys are paid and deeds accepted, must, in the
absence of fraud or collusion, be considered as entitled to full
faith and credit; and cannot, without rendering titles to real
estate exceedingly insecure, be left at any distance of time afterwards to the uncertainty and frailty of parol proof, and to all the
mistakes, prejudices, imperfections, and hazards that attend it."
Schrader v. Decker, 9 Barr 15; Loudon v. Bly-the, 4 Harris
532, 3 Casey 22; Michener and Wife v. aavender, 2 Wright
324, do but confirm and carry out the decision in Jamison v.
Jamison, by holding that fraud and duress will avoid the certificate as to any party to the fraud or volunteers under him, with a
saving to bond fide purchasers without notice.
I can see no difference between the case of the certificate of

CREIGHTON v. LADLEY.

acknowledgment by a married woman, and by a person sui uurs.
As to the married woman the acknowledgment is necessary to
pass her interest, and as to the person sui juris, it is not. Its
effect in the latter case is limited to rendering the deed admissible to record, and as a consequence, admissible in evidence.
The certificate of acknowledgment in either case will not render a
bad deed good. Fraud, forgery, or false personation will avoid
the deed just as at common law, the certificate of acknowledgment
to the contrary notwithstanding. Here is a case in which there
is no pretence to invalidate the lease ; no question as to its due
execution; but simply the recording of it, and that on the ground,
not that there was any fraud intended or practised in procuring
the acknowledgment by the lessor, but simply that she did not go
through the regular and accustomed form. She acknowledged
before the magistrate that she had executed a lease of the premises to Tomlinson and Divine, but she did not acknowledge that
paper to be the lease. The alderman certifies that she did; and
we think, in the absence of fraud, parties claiming under the
mortgagor, as the defendants do here, as well as the plaintiffs,
ought not to be allowed to contradict his certificate. It is not
the case where the acknowledgment is relied on as evidence of
execution and delivery, when undoubtedly, though primd facie,
it may be contradicted. It is simply a question on the acknowledgment as entitling the paper to be recorded.
The plaintiff's paper-book does not show that the admission of
the parol evidence was objected to on the trial; nor is it specifically made one of the reasons for a new trial. ' But we think that
it is substantially included in the first reason assigned, that "the
learned judge refused to instruct the jury as requested in the
plaintiff's first point, which was, that the mortgage from William
Tomlinson to Creighton and Pearce under proceedings in which
the plaintiff purchased the machinery, &c., sued for in this action,
was a valid mortgage under the Act of 27th April 1855." If the
evidence to contradict the certificate was improperly admitted, it
ought to have had no effect, and the jury should have been
instructed that notwithstanding they should believe that evidence,
it did not invalidate the acknowledgment, and that the lease had
been duly recorded with the mortgage; in other words, the plaintiff's first point should have been affirmed. As we view it, it
was the pivot on which the justice of the case turned; and con-
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sidering, on the whole, that in consequence of the admission of
this evidence, and the refusal of the court to charge as requested,
there has been error, we grant a new trial.
STROUD, J., dissenting (after stating the facts).-The plaintiff
requested me to charge: "That the mortgage from William Tomlinson to Creighton and Pearce under proceedings on which the
plaintiff purchased the machinery, &c., sued for in this action,
was a valid mortgage under the Act of Assembly of 27th April
1855, entitled I An act to amend certain defects of the law,' &c."
. There were several other propositions on which I was asked to
charge, and upon which I gave or withheld directions. But there
is no serious contest upon these.
Upon the first point I declined to charge as requested.
The proposition assumes that a certificate of an alderman, that
a writing, the contents of which entitle it to be recorded, has
been acknowledged before him, as their act and deed, by persons
named as parties to such writing, forbids all inquiry as to the
accuracy of the alderman's statement, but the same is to be
regarded as absolute verity, although it be plain on the faceof
the writing, and can be shown by evidence aliunde, that the
alderman was mistaken.
I am not aware of any decision of our court which gives countenance to this doctrine; Jami8on v. Jami8on, 3 Whart. 457, is
said to support it, The syllabus of this case is, the certificate
of the judge or justice ad to the acknowledgment of a deed by a
married woman is to be judged of solely by what appears on the
face of the certificate itself; and parol evidence of what passed

at the time of the acknowledgment is not admissible for the purpose of contradicting the certificate, except in cases of fraudulent
imposition.
I agree entirely with everything which this decision affirms.
In the absence of all evidence of imposition or collusion, each of
which terms is used in the opinion of the court, and would constitute fraud, the certificate ought to be taken as true. It would
destroy all confidence in titles were this not so, whether derived
through conveyances of married or single persons. But surely,to take an example, were it clearly shown that a grantor had been
personated by a stranger to the deed, it would be the rankest
injustice to the real owner of property if proof of the fact should
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be shut out; and I do not doubt that the rights of creditors
of such personated individual would be equally protected by
the law.
Schrader vDecker, 9 P. S. R. 14, and Loudon v. Blythe, 16
Id. 532, s. c. 27 Id. 22, all show that such evidence is admissible wherever those to be reached by it are volunteers or purchasers with notice, or have a knowledge of facts which should
have put them on inquiry. And Mihener v. Cavender, 88 P.
S. R. 834, sustains these decisions to the full extent. The action
was upon a mortgage purporting to have been made by Michener
and his wife to Cavender, and indorsed on the instrufiaent was a
certificate of an alderman stating that both the husband and wife
had acknowledged the mortgage before him to be their act and
deed; that the wife had been examined separately from her husband; that the contents were made known to her and she declaied
that the mortgage had been executed by her without any coercion
or compulsion of her husband. Yet under an appropriate special
plea, the wife was permitted to prove 'that the statement in the
certificate as to her presence before the alderman, and of her
acknowledgment after a separate examination, that the deed had
been executed by her, &c., was utterly untrue.
In each of the decisions just cited, it was ruled that oral evidence contradicting the certificate, although admissible, yet could
not prevail against a purchaser without notice of the fraud. Yet,
it was also held, that the general principle that a knowledge of
facts which ought to have put the purchaser upon inquiry, was
equivalent to actual notice. The fact that the mortgagee was
present some hours before the acknowledgment of the wife was
certified to have been taken; and that she had expressed her
unwillingness to execute the instrument, was sufficient to put him
on inquiry as to the reality of the transaction: Loudon v. Blythe,
16 P. S. R. 532, and the same case on a second trial, 27 Id. 22.
And the evidence of such knowledge was much slighter in ichener v. aavender, and yet was deemed sufficient.
In the case in hand it was plain to the eye, that the instrument,
which the alderman's certificate stated had been acknowledged
before him, was not an original, but purported to be, and was a
copy merely.. It filled up the whole of a sheet of paper, and the
signatures of the parties and of the witnesses were all in the
same handwriting. The paper on which the acknowledgment was

CREIGHTON v. LADLEY.

*written, was on a separate piece, but annexed by eyelets to the
copy of the lease. Such a condition of things must be regarded
as abundant evidence that the alderman's certificate did not import
verity.
Share v. Anderson, 7 S. & R. 48, 68, presented a case in.
which a magistrate of York county took in Lancaster county an
acknowledgment of a deed for lands lying in York. This was
held to be nugatory; it was proved by oral evidence. The statement at page 48 shows this; and it is a fair, if not necessary
implication, that there was nothing on the face of the acknowledgment to indicate it.
. These cases, it is thought, are disposed of by the fact that the
imposifion was practised upon married women, and was a fraud
which, if the magistrate's certificate could not be contradicted by
oral evidence, would divest them of the property- and thus work
great injustice.
Mrs. Hurst, being but a lessor, and her rights being unaffected
by the chattel mortgage, it is said the imposition upon her is not
sufficient to overcome the general rule which prohibits all inquiry
int the conduct of the magistrate.
This view of the subject overlooks the fact that it is to protect
the interest of third persons-creditors and purchasers-that the
law requires the lease to be recorded; and to put a copy on record
and not the original, must be unavailing as notice, according to a
train of decisions too numerous and too well known to need
special citation. 'Yet, I thought upon the trial, and still think,
as I have said already, that it was in the power of Mrs. Hurst, so
far as she was conacerned by intentional admission and acknowledgment before the alderman that the copy was her veritable act
and deed, to adopt it and thus impart to the copy the character
of an original document.
It was for this purpose, and not to defeat the plaintiff, that the
oral testimony was received. Unless it could be sustained in
this way, I considered that it would be my duty to say from
inspection, that the lease, in the sense of the law, had not been
recorded, and, therefore, the plaintiff had failed to make out his
case.
I find it impossible to erase this impression from my mind,
although the fact that I stand alone, is well calculated to make
me distrust the soundness of my conclusion. And as by letting
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the case go to the Supreme Court on the bill of exceptions, the
law on which the whole turns would be settled either by affirming
the judgment and so ending the controversy of the parties, or if
reversed the result would be virtually the same. For from the
nature of the subject the law being once ascertained, there will
be no encouragement to a renewal of serious litigation.
On the other hand, by granting a new trial, it is -not to be
expected that the defendants will retire from the contest, but the
whole ground. will be fought over again; and however the verdict
may be, the case will be carried up to the Supreme Court for
final adjudication. It is froni such considerations, that during the
long period of my judicial connection with the court, it has been
a fixed rule that whenever the judge, who presided at the trial, is
willing to sign a bill of exceptions from which it is apparent that
in whatever way the law shall be'declared to be, the controversy
must end, a rule for a new trial is always refused.
HARE, J., concurring with SHARSWOOD, P. J.-Two things are
requisite to entitle a deed to be recorded: execution including
delivery, and an acknowledgment in due form of law. On the
former point, the certificate of acknowledgment is only primd
facie evidence, lut,it has. been generally held to be conclusive on
the latter, unless fraud can be brought actually or constructively
home to the grantee. The reason of this distinction is sufficiently
obvious. For if it was impossible to go behind an acknowledgment
for any purpose, a man might be deprived of his land by a frauduIent pretence, that he had admitted a deed to be his which he
had never seen or authorized. And, on the other hand, if the
acknowledgment of a deed could be impeached by parol evidence,
when the only question was, whether it was duly acknowledged, a
ceremony intended to give security to purchasers would be an
additional source of danger.
In the case of Uavender v. Michener, 2 Wright 835, which
was tried before me, the execution and delivery of the mortgage
were not at issue, having been admitted of record under the rules
of this court;. but this was not brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court, who supposed that a question eminently of fact,
had been withdrawn from the jury ; and the result was the reversal
of a judgment that might otherwise have been sustained. I do
not, therefore, consider that case as tending to establish that the
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certificate of a magistrate that a deed has been duly acknowledged,
can be disproved for the purpose of subverting the title of an
innocent grantee, where there is no dispute as to the execution of
the deed.
The cause now before us is, in some respects, one of the first'
impression, arising under the provisions of a recent Act of
Assembly with regard to mortgage of leases for years, and presented several nice questions that are not yet, perhaps, quite clear.
One of these was, whether an instrument purporting to be a copy
of an antecedent lease, could be recorded in place of the original,
if acknowledged in due form of law. If the jury had found for
the defendant under the instructions of the court, on the ground
that the copy was not executed and delivered as a new lease, I
should have been inclined to let their decision stand as the
readiest means of obtaining the opinion of a court of error on
the law. A copy is not necessarily a counterpart, and the question whether it is so or not, is mainly one of fact that may properly be left to and determined by a jury. But what the verdict
tends, as I understand it, to establish, is not that the copy was
not so ratified or confirmed as to become virtually an original,
but that it was not duly acknowledged as a copy. And as this
conflicts with the certificate of acknowledgment on a point where
the certificate ought to be conclusive, a new trial should, in my
opinion, be awarded.
The object of the recording acts is to give notice, and a formally authenticat'ed copy may be as effectual for this purpose as
the instrument which it represents. And this is consistent with
the invariable practice, which has been to place a copy on record
and not the deed. Whether that copy is transcribed from the
original, or from a copy acknowledged by the grantor, can, as it
would seem, make little difference to the grantor, or those claiming under him as creditors or purchasers. And it may well be,
that if the mortgage is duly recorded, an acknowledged copy of
the lease recorded with it will satisfy the requisitions of the law.
Rule absolute for new trial.
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'Supreme Court of New York.
CLARK AND HOYT v. RANKIN.
The rules of law deduced from the maxim caveat emptor, have reference generally,
and more particularly, to the condition of personal property sold by one party to
another.
The general rule is, that the purchaser is bound to examine and ascertain the
defects in the thing sold, and unless there is some misrepresentation or artifice to
disguise it, or some warranty as to its qualities or character, the vendee is bound by
the contract, notwithstanding there may be intrinsic defects and vices in it, known
its value.
to the vendor and unknown to the vendee, materially affecting
The maxim of caveat emptor has no application to cases of actual successfulfraud
practised by the vendor upon the vendee.
The question whether the vendee was actually deceived is always open. If he
was not deceived. by the representations or acts of the vendor, though they were
false, then he has no cause of action.
On a sale of certain, leases, or leasehold estate, by the defendant to the plaintiffs,
the former represented and stated that the property rented for $4000 yearly, and a
written statement was produced by the defendant of the rents to be received from the
property, footing at about that amount. This stetement contained a list of the
leases and the amount of rents reserved. Among the leases therein specified was a
lease to the Buffalo and Lake Huron Railway Company, for ten years, at a yearly
rent of $600. Nearly seven years and ten months of the term was expired. In
fact, the rent to accrue upon that lease, thereafter, Was only $111.11 annually, the
sum of $5000 having been already paid upon such lease, and indorsed thereon,
according to the terms of payment specified therein. Hed, that notwithstanding
the lease, with the indorsement, showed that $5000 of the rent was payable at two
specified periods prior to the sale of the lease to the plaintiffs, and that the same
had been paid, when due, leaving only a yearly rent of $111.11 to be paid in future;
and assuming that under ordinary circumstances it would have been the duty of the
plaintiffs to examine the lease assigned, to see whether it contained any special or
unusual provisions ; yet that the fraudulent acts and representations of the defendant
were well calculated to satisfy them, and to cause them to omit such examination ;
and that, the plaintiffs having been actually deceived and defrauded by means of such
representation, an action lay for damages. Gnovxn, P. J., dissenting.
Held, also, that the right of the plaintiffs to recover did not depend upon their
care and prudence in examining the lease in respect to the rents reserved and the
payments that had been already made. That they had a right to rely upon the
representations made by the defendants that the rents reserved amounted to $4000
annually, and that to make up this sum, the annual rent on the railroad lease
was $600.
That, in other words, the omission of the plaintiffs to examine the lease and the
receipts upon it was not such negligence as would deprive them of a right of recovery.
That the facts being established by the undisputed evidence, the question whether
the omission of the plaintiffs to examine the railway lease involved such a want of
care and prudence as to defeat their right to recover, was a question of law to bedecided by the court, and should not have been submitted to the jury.

THs action was brought to recover damages which the plaintiffs
alleged they had sustained by means of certain false represelita-
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tions, concerning the amount of rent payable upon a lease sold and
assigned to them by the defendant. By the terms of the lease, the
premises described in it were demised at the yearly rent of $600,
payable $3000 at its execution and delivery, $2000 on the 1st
of January 1863, and the residue in semi-annual payments there-'
after. The term created extended for the period of ten years
from the 1st of January 1862. This lease was written on the
alternate pages of five and one-half half-sheets of paper. On the
back of the fifth page were two indorsements, of the three and
two thousand dollars. The lease was present at the time the
assignment of it was made, but not opened or examined by either
of the plaintiffs or their counsel. Evidence was given tending to
prove that the defendant represented to the plaintiffs, that this
lease would yield an annual rent of $600, and that they bought
and received an assignment of it believing such representation to
be true, which was controverted by evidence given on the part
of the defendant.
The court charged the jury that if they were satisfied, and
should find, that the defendant falsely and fraudulently represented to the plaintiffs that they would receive annually $600 on
the lease, and that the plaintiffs were thereby led to believe, and
did believe, that they would receive that amount, and that
relying on such representations they made the purchase in
question, and that but for such representations they would not
'have made it; and if they were also satisfied and should find that
the plaintiffs did exercise ordinary care and prudence -in availing
themselves of the means of knowledge in their possession, for
ascertaining the terms of the railroad lease, and the payment of
rent in pursuance of such terms, then the plaintiffs would be
entitled to recover.
The plaintiffs excepted to that part of the charge which made
their right to recover dependent on the exercise of ordinary care
and prudence in availing themselves of the means of knowledge
in their possession. And they asked the court to charge the
jury that they would be entitled to recover even if they did not
exercise such ordinary care and prudence, if the jury found the
other facts referred to in the charge in their favor. The court
refused so to charge, and the plaintiffs excepted. The jury found
a verdict for the defendant. And the court ordered the excep.
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tions taken to be -first heard at the General Term, and the judgment in the mean time to be suspended.
-. A. Hfalbert, for plaintiffs.
Hf. iS. Cutting, for defendant.
DANIELS, J.-The effect of the charge given to the jury in this
case, was such as to deprive the plaintiffs of the right to recover,
even though the defendant had perpetrated a fraud upon them by
misrepresenting the amount of rent payable on the lease, and had
successfully impressed them with the conviction that such misrepresentations were true, and in that manner drawn them into the
purchase to their injury and loss. If the law will be found to
tolerate misconduct of that character, on account of the ability
of the wrongdoer to impress his victim with such a degree of confidence in his statements as to silence his suspicions and disarm
his caution, then certainly it is high time, for the promotion of
public morals as well as fair dealing, that the legislature should
provide for a change in it. For in such a form it will be found
of very little use, either by way of restraint or protection, in the
business affairs of our communities. The effect of such a rule
will be to afford protection to those whose cautious suspicions and
experience are generally sufficient for that purpose without it,
and to withhold protection entirely from those whose inexperience
and artless confidence render them the most in need of it. Men
are naturally confiding, and disposed to believe the statements
made with apparent candor and plausibility by others. And
that disposition usually continues until experience exhibits the
facility with which integrity is subdued by interest. When that
point is reached, the rule laid down at the circuit may be rendered a practical one, though it would still be found exceedingly
deficient. There can be no good reason for the postponement of
the application of a salutary rule of law to such a period in the
progress of human affairs. For in the mean time it would most
effectually legalize all the acts, devices, and tricks of unscrupulous men, so far as they might be resorted to for the purpose
of imposing upon and defrauding that large portion of every
community which is confiding, truthful, unsuspecting, and
inexperienced.
Although authorities may be found sustaining the qualification
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of the law adopted in this case, it is believed, in view of others
of a different nature, that they are not entitled to be regarded as
decisive or controlling. Such will be found to be the cases of
Ta lman v. Green., 3 Sandf. S. 0. 441, and White v. Seaver, 25
Barb. 242. And some loose statements by text-writers may'
occasionally be found to favor the same conclusion. But generally the only qualification of the right of the party defrauded to
recover, is made to depend upon his actual knowledge of the
untruth of the representations made to him, or his neglect to
avail himself of the means of such knowledge, when they are
within the reach of his immediate observation. The rule is laid
down in general terms and without qualification by Story, that"Where the party intentionally, or by design, misrepresents a
material fact, or produces a false impression, in order to mislead
another, or to entrap or cheat him, or to obtain an undue advantage of him, in every such case there is a positive fraud in the
truest sense of the term :" Story's Eq. Jur. § 192. See, also,
to the same effect, Chitty on Con., 7th Am. ed. 683. And Kent
states the rule still more broadly, perhaps too broadly, in cases
of mere concealment, to meet the entire approval of some more
modern authorities.
But even as to those cases, the rule of law, as it is stated by
Kent, seems to have lately received the sanction of the Court of
Appeals. See Brown v. liontgomery, 20 N. Y. 287. On this
-subjecthe says: "As a g'nera-l rule, each party is bound to communicate to the other his knowledge of material facts, provided
he knows the other to be ignorant of them, and they be not open
or naked, or equally within the reach of his observation." "In
the sale of a ship which had a latent defect known to the seller,
and which the buyer could not by any attention possibly discover,
the seller was held to be bound to disclose it, and the concealment was justly considered to be a breach of honesty and good
faith." " So, if one party suffers the other to buy an article
under a delusion created by his own conduct, it will be deemed
fraudulent and fatal to the contract." "When, however, the
means of information relative to facts and circumstances affecting
the value of the commodity be equally accessible to both parties,
and neither of them does or says anything tending to impose upon
the other, the disclosure of any superior knowledge which one
party may have over the other, as to those facts and circum-
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stances, is not requisite to the validity of the contract." "There
is no breach of any implied confidence, that one party will not
profit by his superior knowledge as to facts and circumstances
open to the observation of both parties, or equally within the
reach of their ordinary diligence, because neither party reposes
in any such confidence, unless it be specially tendered or
required." In this case, it must be remembered that it was both
tendered and required. And again, he says: "1The law reconciles the claims of convenience with the duties of good faith to
every extent compatible with the interests of commerce. This it
does by requiring the purchaser to apply his attention to those
particulars which may be supposed within the reach of his observation and judgment, and the vendor to communicate those particulars and defects which cannot be supposed to be immediately
within the reach of such attention: 2 Kent's Com. 482 et seT. In
Vernon v. Keys, 12 East 632, the rule was laid down that the seller
was liable, where he fraudulently misrepresents the quality of the
thing sold, in some particulars, where the buyer has not equal means
of knowledge with himself. In Smith v. Countryman, 80 N. Y.
655,4 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 102, a contract for the sale of hops was
held void for fraud, because the defendant was induced to enter into
it by the representation that Ellwood, a large and experienced hopdealer, and a near neighbor of the defendant, had sold his own
hops at the price mentioned by the purchaser, who was the plaintiff's assignor. He also produced his book to the defendant,i
which he had entered everal contracts with other persons for
their hops. The objection that the defendant could not maintain
his defence, because by the observance of ordinary diligence he
could have discovered that the representations were untrue, was
not allowed to prevail. In the case of Head v. Bruin, 32 N. Y.
275, it was held to -be fraudulent for .a mortgagee to falsely
represent to the mortgagor the terms of payment mentioned in
tAe mortgage. The objection was taken in that case, that the
plaintiff was not at liberty to credit the false representation. But
the court held otherwise, because the defendant represented that
the mortgage had been designedly and untruly read over by the
scrivener before the mortgagor signed it. And in a subsequent
part of the opinion, considering the effect of an offer made by the
defendant, after it was claimed he had had constructive notice of
the fraud, Judge PoRTER, delivering the opinion of the court,
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says: " This proposition rests on the mistaken assumption, that a
false representation by one of the parties to a contract puts the
other on inquiry as to its truth. Every contracting party has
an absolute right to rely on the express statement of an existing.
fact, the truth of which is known to the opposite party and
unknown to him, as the basis of a mutual engagement; and he is
under no obligation to investigate and verify statements to the
truth of which the other party to the contract, with full means of
knowledge, has deliberately pledged his faith:" Id. 280. This
conclusion appears to have secured the approbation of all the
members of the court in that case. And it is entirely in harmony
with the general theory of the law upon this subject, as that is
indicated by the early as well as modern authorities-: Polhtill v.
Walter, 3 Barn. & Ad. 114; Freeman v. Baker, 5 Id. 797;
Posterv. Oharles, 6 Bing. 396; 7 Id. 103; 1 Cowen's Treat.
2d ed. 810-12. In the first of these cases, it was held that the
telling of an untruth with intent to induce a man to alter his condition, and his altering his condition in consequence, whereby he
sustains damages, fulfils all the requisites to support an action for
deceit. And Matson v. Boulson, 7 E. L. & Eq. 585; Peter v.
Wright, 6 Ind. 183; Smith v. Bi1ards, 13 Peters 80; and The
Queen v. Wickham, 10 Ad. & E. 84, fully sustain the same conclusion. This is not only sound in point of morals, but it
is believed to be equally so in law; and it has the merit of
meeting the requirements of every trading and commercial community on this subject: for it affords protection and: redress to
tie artless, inexperienced, and confiding, as well as to those who
are cautious, experienced, and sagacious. The same ruling was
made in the case of Dhe People v. Sully, 5 Parker's Crim. Rep.
142. Upon the trial of the indictment in that case, the court
was requested to charge, that the defendant could not be convicted
unless the representation was one to which a person of ordinary
caution would give credit. The court declined so to charge; and
this ruling was sustained by the general term, in the Superior
Court of Buffalo, and afterwards affirmed in the Court of Appeals.
MARTEN, Justice, in the course of his opinion in the Superior
Court, says: "All men are not equally prudent or cautious, and
the statute was passed for the protection of the weaker and more
credulous and non-suspecting part of mankind. If, therefore, an
assertion of the existence of such a fact be falsely, wilfully, and
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designedly made, to induce another to part with his property,
with intent to cheat him, and the assertion accomplishes the object
for which it was made, the offence under the statute is complete:"
Id. 166. And no more stringent rule should be applied in actions
for damages, than that which, under the statute, has been adopted
in criminal cases. Under the authority of the rule already maintained, the plaintiffs were at liberty to rely upon the assurances
given by the defendant's representations, without consulting any
means in their possession, and not then under their immediate
observation, for the purpose of discovering whether such representations were truly or falsely made.
The verdict should be set aside, and a new trial directed.
DAvis and MARVIN, JJ., concurred, MARV=,.J., delivering an
opinion, which will be found reported in 46 Barb. 570.
GROVER,

P. J., dissented..

Supreme Court of Pensytlvania.
CITIZENS' INSURANCE CO. v. J. Y. McLAUGHLIN.
A fire insurance upon the buildings of a manufactory covers all risks arising

from the use of articles ordinarily used in such manufactories, unless such risks be
expressly excepted.
In an insurance on the buildings of a patent leather manufactory, benzole being

an article of common use in such establishments, the policy reciting-" Privilege
granted of keeping not more than five barrels of benzole in a-small shed entirqly
detached from all the other buildings, situated on the rear end of the lot, about 100
feet from the main building, and nowhere else on said .premises," the prohibition
oxcludes the beuzole as stored in bulk, from the factory, but not its use in the conduct of the business in the ordinary way.

A witness whose knowledge of the custom as to the use of certain articles., is
acquired in similar manufactories in other localities, is competent to testify as to the
usage of the business.
ERROR

to the District Court of Allegheny county.

Woods &' Purviance, for plaintiff in error.
Veech, contra,.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODWARD, C. J.-Assuming that the fire originated from the
use of benzole in the patent-leather manufactory, the material
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question was, whether the use of that article was a violation of the
conditions of the policy. The policy granted the "privilege of
keeping not more than five barrels of benzole in a small shed
entirely detached from all the other buildings, situated on the,
rear end of the lot, about one hundred feet from the main building, and nowhere else on said premises." But the shed containing the benzole was expressly excepted out of the policy.
The custom of the workmen was to carry an open bucket of
benzole into the factory, ais often as wanted to be used in reducing
the composition called " sweet-meat," an article that was used in
the manufacture of patent leather, and on the morning of the fire
one of -them had carried in a bucket containing three or four gallons of benzole, which he set down in the middle of the room and
turned to the door, when it took fire from some unknown cause,
and communicated the flames to the building which was wholly
consumed.
The argument on behalf of the company is, that the policy both
in letter and spirit meant to confine the benzole to the shed on the
rear of the lot, and to exclude it from any other part of the
premises; that carrying it from the shed in open buckets across
the yard, and setting it down in a room with the door open, was
an abuse of the privilege granted by the company, which, if it
could -have been anticipated, would have prevented their taking
.the risk; that such use of it was keeping it elsewhere than in the
shed, and was, therefore, a palpable violation of the covenant.
The answer which the learned judge made to this argument was
substantially as follows :-You insured a patent-leather manufactory; you knew, for you were bound to know, that benzole was
ordinarily used in such factories; you. stipulated that five barrels
of it might be kept on hand near to the factory; and the necessary presumption is that you meant it might be kept for use in
that factory as the article is ordinarily used in similar factories.
If therefore it was kept in the place stipulated, and used according to the custom of the trade, it was one of the risks covered by
the policy. The jury found the fact that the mode of using it
was according to custom, and so recovery was had.
It appears to us that the argument was well answered. This
business is not enumerated in the list of hazardous risks, and the
company could not have expected it to be suspended, nor to be
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carried on in any other than the customary modes. They insured
it. They took the risk, after having their attention drawn to the
dangerous article, and after excluding it, as stored in bulk, from
the policy. But did they mean to exclude it from the factory as
an element or agent in the conduct of the business ? To assume
that they did, in the absence of language to that effect, would be
to assume that they expected the business to stop, or to be carried
on out of the usual mode. The words of the policy descriptive
of the subject-matter of the insurance, are, "the buildings of
their tannery and patent-leather manufactory," and it must be
intended that these words included whatever, not expressly
excepted, was necessary and essential in conducting such a business. In the case of Harperv. The City/nsurance Co., 1 Bos.
N. Y. Rep. 520, this was the doctrine applied to'a printing establishment where the fire originated from the use of camphene, which
was one of the hazardous articles enumerated by the policy, but
it appeared that camphene was ordinarily used by printers for
cleaning their types and plates, and was so used in that instance.
On this ground it was treated as one of the risks covered by the
policy. See, also, Girard Insurance Co. v. Stephenson, 1
Wright 198.
We think there was no error in the admission of the testimony
of F. T. Harden. He gave an intelligible account of the mode
of using benzole in twelve factories at Newark, New Tersey, and
said it was brought in and used from cans and buckets. If any
other custom had been established at Pittsburgh it could have
been shown; but in the absence of all other evidence on the
subject, this was competent to fix the usage of the business.
The judgment is aflirmed.

